This paper tries to empirically verify the argument that institutional factors such as enforcement mechanisms, political and economic stability, stable and reliable, transparent legal and regulatory framework and corruption are critical in explaining the behaviour of the foreign direct investment infl ows in Turkey. The main objective of the study is to ascertain the nature of the obstacles and impediments to the greater fl ow of foreign direct investments into Turkish economy for the recent period by focusing on the results of a questionnaire applied to the executives of 52 multinational corporations operating in Turkey in 2006.
Introduction
Since 1980, the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) infl ows to developing countries have been substantially increasing and compared to other capital fl ows, have remained the largest component of net resource fl ows to developing countries (UNCTAD 2006a) . In these countries, governments believe that FDI will help economic development and they try to attract FDI through policies and investment incentives designed to increase investor interest in an attempt to benefi t from the potential economic development. Hence, with the liberalization of many developing economies, FDI has become a crucial medium through which developing economies become unifi ed on a global basis.
On the other hand, despite several efforts of governments, Turkey has never been able to attract the substantial FDI infl ows that would be expected from a nation with a strategic location between Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia 2 .
In this paper, I conducted a questionnaire survey to explore the mechanisms linking macroeconomic vari-ables and political institutions to FDI fl ows, and interviewed representatives of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) operating in Turkey in order to understand the reasons of low level of FDI fl ows into the country.
FDI Performance of Turkey from a Comparative Perspective
Turkish FDI levels have stagnated during the 1990s while total FDI worldwide increased by a factor of 12. This lack of interest by multinational companies becomes even clearer when FDI infl ows are adjusted to the size of the economy. Over the last decade, the average FDI infl ows to middle-income countries in Europe were 1.1 percent of GDP compared to less than 0.5 percent in Turkey. As shown in the following fi gure, this disparity is considerably greater when Turkey is compared to the countries investors considered to be its main regional competitors: Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland. Fig. 1 reveals the inward FDI stock levels of selected emerging economies as a percentage of GDP. Com-paring Turkey with other emerging economies such as Brazil, Mexico, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Poland, it can be argued that the inward FDI performance of Turkey is ineffective. The level of FDI stock in Turkey remained stagnant at approximately 10 percent during the 1990s, fl uctuated after 2000 and reached approximately 12 percent in 2005. Whereas inward FDI stock of all other countries increased signifi cantly. Hungary and the Czech Republic are the most successful countries at attracting increasing inward FDI stock. The transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, although entering the competition in the beginning of the 1990s, attracted more FDI in comparison to Turkey in the period.
Another way to view Turkey's relative FDI performance as a host country is in terms of two indices developed by UNCTAD: The FDI Performance Index and the FDI Potential Index. The Inward FDI Performance Index ranks countries by the FDI they receive relative to their economic size. It is the ratio of a country's share in global FDI infl ows to its share in global GDP (Table 1) 3 . The Index is shown for three-year periods to offset annual fl uctuations in the data and covers 141 economies for as much of the period as the data permit; however, some economies in transition could not be ranked in the early years for lack of data or because they did not exist as separate countries 4 .
According to the inward performance index, Turkey ranks 95th with a score of 0.917. This low score indicates that Turkey receives less FDI than its relative economic size.
A more complex index, the Inward FDI Potential Index, captures several factors (apart from market size) expected to affect an economy's attractiveness to foreign investors. It is an average of the values of 12 variables 5 : Table 2 demonstrates that, Turkey has a better position than Inward FDI performance index, however, still standing behind other emerging markets. Central and East European countries are more successful than selected Latin American countries. The strength in education and infrastructure in these countries makes them attractive, especially for fi rms motivated by vertical strategy.
According to the matrix of the FDI potential and FDI performances of the countries, Turkey takes place within the list of countries that have high FDI potential but low FDI performance 6 . In order to understand the reasons why countries attract different amounts of FDI, in specifi c, why Turkey receives FDI fl ows below its potential, a brief overview of the existing literature on the determinants of FDI is of the essence.
The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment and the role of Institutions

Core Theories of FDI
The motives for investing abroad either by establishing a new corporation or investing in established fi rms have received remarkable attention from scholars 7 . Their main concern is answering the question: What explains patterns of FDI fl ows across the globe?
The literature on determinants of FDI is very new. The early writings on FDI go back only to the 1950s. Until the 1960s, except for a few works by political economists, there was no systematic explanation of, model of or theory on FDI activities. Stephen Hymer (1976) made the fi rst theoretical approach 8 . He was one of the fi rst scholars to separate FDI from portfolio investment and initiated a new literature on the determinants of FDI. Through 1960 and 1970 new theories of FDI were introduced. Vernon (1966) used the product life cycle approach, which is based on the existence of market imperfections across nations, to develop a theory of foreign direct investment. Later, it was argued that monopolistic advantages, which are created by both advertising and research and development investments, characterize not just specifi c fi rms but rather fi rms within oligopolistic industries. Knickerbocker (1973) showed evidence that the timing of U.S. MNCs' FDI is largely determined by their oligopolistic reaction "follow the leader" theory to competitors' investment.
While industrial organization models were the dominant line in studying FDI until the 1970s, a new theory, called "internationalization theory," was proposed to explain how fi rms are involved in international op-erations and make resource commitments to foreign markets. The term "internationalization" is used to describe an evolutionary process in which the fi rm gradually increases its international involvement.
In the 1970s, Dunning's eclectic paradigm dominated the literature. Dunning introduced the concept of "OLI" as a theoretical framework to analyze the determinants of FDI. This framework considers FDI as determined by Ownership, Location and Internalization advantages of fi rms investing abroad (Dunning 1970) . The OLI paradigm has remained the center of FDI theory and other scholars have expanded on this framework.
More recently, the motives of FDI have been examined in two categories. In this view a fi rm realizes the investment to better serve the local market or to get lower-cost inputs, or both. In other words, FDI can be divided into "horizontal" or "market-seeking" FDI, and "vertical" or "effi ciency-seeking" FDI.
The fi rst involves building plants in a host country to supply the local market. This approach is done to reduce the costs that arise from supplying the market through exporting, in which case, market size and high tariffs play a large role in determining profi tability. The latter category of vertical FDI is production cost-minimizing, where fi rms seek to produce in lower cost locations or seek inexpensive inputs in order to export their product. Inexpensive inputs include natural resources, raw materials, or low-cost inputs such as labour. In other words, differentiation between the two is that market-seeking FDI aims at penetrating the local markets of the host country, whereas effi ciencyseeking FDI is interested in creating new sources of competitiveness for fi rms.
Finally, Asset-Seeking FDI is the most recent motive for FDI to be identifi ed. It refers to a strategy that aims to access and exploit technological assets in overseas countries. Developed countries are the main recipients of R&D investment, but countries such as Hungary, Czech Republic, India and Brazil are also attracting more and more Research and Development projects. Asset-seeking MNCs focus on the skilled labour availability, research institutes, large supply of graduate labour, created assets including innovative capacity, technological adoption, and technical skills when choosing an investing location (Michalet 1997: 12-15 ). FDI driving forces and outcomes for host economies have been thoroughly analyzed in recent scientifi c literature Tvaronavičienė 2003, 2004; Tvaronavičienė and Degutis 2007; Tvaronavičienė and Grybaitė 2007; Tvaronavičienė et al. 2008; Degutis and Tvaronavičienė 2006) .
The Role of Institutions
As seen above, studies of FDI fl ows at the fi rm level, in common, emphasize that fi rms as profi t maximizing agents are motivated by exploiting their own advantages abroad, such as access to patented technology, specifi c management or marketing skills or ownership of brand names. This view is fi rm-level centered, yet, in these studies; the role of social, political and economic institutions has rarely been treated.
On the other hand, since the 1990s, in the international literature, the number of studies mentioning the importance of institutions determining economic growth and FDI has increased signifi cantly. Especially in the economic growth literature, a number of scholars such as Knack and Keefer (1995: 207-227) , Mauro (1995: 681-712) , Hall and Jones (1999) , Acemoglu et al. (2002 Acemoglu et al. ( , 2005 have emphasized that political, institutional and legal environment of a country, to a great extent, determine the economic performance. Institutions lead to a fall in both transaction and information costs by reducing uncertainty and establishing a therefore stable structure to facilitate interactions, defi ne and enforce property rights; and determine the degree of competition by defi ning the terms of market entry (North 1990; Coase 1960) . Hence, the stronger the political, economic and social institutions are, the higher the economic growth rates realized will be.
Institutions can be economic, political or social in nature. Economic institutions determine the "economic rules of the game"-in particular, the degree of property rights enforcement, the set of contracts that can be written and enforced, and some of the rules and regulations that determine the economic opportunities open to agents (individual property rights, commercial law, contract law, patent law, the type of credit arrangements, etc.) 9 .
The institutional framework has three components: formal rules, informal rules, and enforcement mechanisms. Formal rules are the written rules of a society. Laws governing contracts, crime, political systems, product information, the imposition of tariffs or quotas, the regulation of banks, and so on are all formal institutions (North 1990: 36-61) . Formal rules can be created by fi rms as well as governments.
Informal rules are the unwritten rules of a society. These include culture, norms of behaviour, codes of conduct, and so on. Citizens of a country grow up learning all kinds of unwritten norms and attitudes and informal rules differ across nations (for example, meal times are often set by custom).
The third component of the institutional framework is enforcement. Institutions often are ineffective if they are not enforced. For example, a nation can have antitrust laws that prevent fi rms from becoming monopolies, but if the government does not enforce such laws, businesses may act as if the antitrust law did not exist. Some institutions are self-enforcing (for example, driving on the right side of the road when no police are in sight). Enforcement is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon. Countries may enforce laws strongly, marginally, or not at all. Enforcement is an integral part of a nation's institutional framework and may be the single most important element in explaining differences in economic performance (North 1990: 54-61) .
FDI and institutions literature review
In the international literature, scholars studying the relationship between institutions and FDI face several diffi culties for the reason that, institutional variables are not readily available. To meet the needs for an in-depth and exhaustively researched analysis of the non-economic variables such as potential risks to international business operations, several organizations created statistical models to calculate risks and backed it up with analyses that explain the numbers and examine what the numbers do not show. The result is a comprehensive system that enables various types of risk to be measured and compared between countries.
The data measuring the quality of institutional variables are produced by independent private fi rms who provide consulting services to international investors such as the PRS Group publishing the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), the Freedom House (FH), or the Transparency International (TI). To a certain extent, these indices provide very similar information on various aspects of institutions. However, some should pay attention to the facts that fi rst indices can be considered to be subjective and more important, they measure the perceptions of governance quality rather than its actual quality.
In the literature there are several empirical studies mentioning the importance of institutional variables by applying econometric models or questionnaire surveys. Empirical research on the impact of host country institutions on FDI has demonstrated that the general institutional, social and legal framework infl uences FDI. Wei (1997) states that corruption within the political system is a threat to foreign investment by distorting the economic and fi nancial environment, reducing the effi ciency of the government and business by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather than ability, and introducing inherent instability into the political process. Mauro (1997) uses the Business International (BI) indices to argue that corruption does in fact hurt growth and investment. The fi ndings of Habib and Zurawicki (2001) support the argument that high level of corruption deters FDI.
A number of studies mention that lack of political and economic stability, unclear regulatory frameworks, an inexperienced bureaucracy, an underdeveloped court system deter more FDI infl ows to host economies. Wheeler and Mody (1992) examine American fi rms investing abroad and write that political risk factors, the functioning of the bureaucracy, corruption and judicial system have strong impact on these fi rms and they emphasize that these facts had strong negative impact on MNCs operating abroad. Gastanaga et al. (1998) examined the relationship between political variables and FDI and found that high enforcement mechanisms, low corruption levels affect FDI positively. Oxley (1999) and Smarzynska (1999) found that weak property rights inhibit FDI infl ows.
In his comprehensive study, Jensen (2006) states that the overall effect of democratic institutions is positive and democracies should be associated with higher infl ows of FDI. Li and Resnick (2003) argue that incremental improvements in property rights protection induce a more attractive environment for foreign direct investors.
In his doctorate dissertation, Dumludag (2007) applies panel data regressions (factor analysis) including 67 developing countries for the period 1984-2005. The results of the dissertation make a real contribution to the empirical literature by validating the role of a large set of institutional variables (such as democratic accountability, corruption, investment profi le, government stability, political rights, and civil liberties) on foreign direct investment fl ows. Dumludag and Sukruoglu (2007) fi nd the same results when they applied panel data regressions for 22 emerging countries.
The second group of cross-country analyses including more recent data emphasizes the importance of human capital as a signifi cant determinant of FDI. Noorbakhsh et al. (2001) using a dataset that covers the 1980s to the mid-1990s, empirically tested the hypothesis that the level of human capital in host countries may affect the geographical distribution of FDI. These empirical fi ndings are: (a) human capital is a statistically signifi cant determinant of FDI infl ows; (b) human capital is one of the most important determinants; and (c) its importance has become increasingly greater through time. Nunnenkamp and Spatz (2002) report that efforts to provide better education and training would enhance the economic growth effects of FDI in developing countries.
The Turkish case and the survey
This paper tries to empirically verify the argument that in institutional factors such as enforcement mechanisms, political and economic stability, civil and political rights and corruption are also critical in explaining the behaviour of the foreign direct investment infl ows in case of the Turkish economy.
There is a growing literature on FDI infl ows to Turkey. While some of them focus on the macroeconomic or microeconomic variables as determinants, some conduct surveys and list the results by using macro data, industry data, and fi rm level data.
In the 1960s and 1970s, Selik (1961) , Esiner (1966) , Oksay (1967) , Bulutoglu (1970) , in their descriptive studies, explained regulations concerning FDI and every legal and procedural step to be taken by the potential investor in Turkey. However, the studies lack guidelines on how to improve the investment climate and how to encourage a greater infl ow of the foreign capital urgently needed for the development of Turkey. Tuncer (1968) represents the most serious and scientifi c research undertaken in Turkey on the subject of FDI in the 1960s. It is comprehensive and objective and it seems to be the result of extensive documentary research. The study concludes that the place of foreign investment in the total private investment in Turkey is not important and its effect on employment is not signifi cant because of its concentration in capital intensive operations.
In the 1970s the number of studies using questionnaire surveys increased. Ashkin (1972) used techniques such as documentary research, questionnaire surveys, and personal interviews. He shows the dimensions of foreign fi rms containing foreign capital in Turkey, the attitudes of these fi rms towards the Turkish economy, the investment and fi nancial climate, government applications and public opinion. Later, Şahin (1975) , arguing that the statistical data were unreliable spent his time searching for reliable data. He also used the results of questionnaires (79 of 112 fi rms containing foreign capital). According to his questionnaire results, he confi rms that FDI infl ow in Turkey is below the level expected in the period examined and then offers suggestions in order to attract more FDI.
In 1979 While there are some other studies dealing with FDI in Turkey in the form of articles, books or chapters in books, the studies mentioned here are the best known and most comprehensive ones. Their common elements are that the authors administered questionnaires to FDI fi rms, applied econometric models, they relied on primary sources, in some cases generated their own statistical data by collecting sources, and they examined the contribution of FDI fi rms to Turkish economy, the reasons for the low level of FDI infl ow and fi nally, most of them offer similar suggestions to increase the infl ow of FDI.
On the other hand, not all of them built strong theoretical frameworks from an institutional perspective or conducted complete surveys of theoretical studies. While some of them focus on the macroeconomic or microeconomic variables as determinants, some conduct surveys and list the results without coherent theoretical framework.
Questionnaire Survey
In my empirical analysis, I engaged in substantial fi eldwork in 2006. I conducted a questionnaire survey to explore the mechanisms linking macroeconomic variables and political institutions to FDI fl ows, and interviewed representatives of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) operating in Turkey. In these interviews I asked both open-ended and closed-ended questions regarding the factors that were important in multinationals selecting investment locations, and I followed up these questions with specifi c questions on how they evaluated the importance of specifi c policies and institutions 10 . Also, I had the opportunity to conduct interviews with some of the representatives of nongovernmental organizations.
The questionnaire not only examines the impact of institutional variables on FDI, but also the effect of horizontal and vertical strategies is examined. All participants in the study were guaranteed complete confi dentiality in their responses. Hence, in-keeping with this confi dentiality clause, the data presented in this paper is based upon the summary statistics drawn from the database of survey respondents.
The questionnaires were sent by mail to 300 executives of MNCs. However, 52 executives returned their surveys. 18 fi rms replied that they were either unable or unwilling to participate in the study, most stating company policy and/or confi dentiality issues as reasons for their non-participation. A further 40 questionnaire packets were returned unopened and given the fact that these fi rms had recently relocated.
In the survey, 40 of 52 respondents were general managers; fi ve of them were fi nance managers, four of them marketing managers and three of them assistant general managers.
The sectoral distribution of responding fi rms is demonstrated in Fig. 2 .
Thirty-seven percent of the fi rms belong to fi nancial intermediation; manufacturing is the second largest sector with a share of 27 percent to which the respondents belong. The transport, storage and communications sector is the third largest sector with 12 percent. Wholesale and Retail Trade has eight percent, whereas, construction sector has a share of four percent. Other sectors, including agriculture, electricity, real estate, wholesale and retail have 12 percent in total.
On the other hand, the sectoral distribution of MNCs operating in Turkey by 2006 can be seen in Fig. 3 . According to Fig. 3 , 40 percent of the MNCs in Turkey operate in the fi nancial intermediation sector. The transport, storage and communications sector has a share of 38 percent, very close to fi nancial intermediation. Third largest sector MNCs belong to is manufacturing with a share of eleven percent. The wholesale and retail trade sector has a share of fi ve percent.
The sectoral distribution of respondents fi rms is similar to the sectoral distribution of total MNCs in Turkey, except that the second largest sector is manufacturing with 27 percent in the questionnaire survey, whereas it is the third largest sector with a share of 11 percent. On the other hand, the transport, storage and communications sector is the second largest sector with 38 percent in Turkey, it has a share of 12 percent in the survey.
Executives of MNCs agree that Turkey's one of the strongest attractions is its large domestic market. The consensus on this is very strong, and is seen in every survey 11 . Table 3 demonstrates that growth of the market with a mean of 4.29 is the initial motive for foreign investors operating in Turkey. The size of the market with a mean of 3.69 and penetration into a new market with a mean of 3.33 show that the Turkish economy is attractive for foreign investors regarding horizontal strategy.
To watch or forestall a competitor's motive with the lowest mean of 2.38 implies that foreign investors pay attention to market size economy more than just forestalling a competitor's action.
High mean scores of horizontal strategy (higher than vertical strategy) reveal that the most important motives are the market size related indicators. The executives, during the interviews, mentioned the importance of the growth of the market and added that thanks to stabilization policies, they expect continuous high growth rates.
From Table 4 it could be suggested that although horizontal strategy is a priority for foreign investors, vertical strategy also plays an important role for them. Turkey scores higher in availability of skilled labour than its East European competitors. In 2000 Turkey In Turkey not only cheap labour for foreign investors is appropriate (with a mean 3.37), but the availability of skilled labour is also important with a mean score of 3.22. Some should take into account that most of the respondents belong to fi nancial intermediation which require skilled labour in most cases. As export base for neighbouring countries, with a mean of 3.24 is also signifi cant. Turkey is located between Europe and the Middle East and Caucasus. Therefore several foreign investors consider Turkey as an export base for these countries or regions. The availability of industrial infrastructure has a mean of 3.12. With a mean score of 2.78, gaining access to raw materials is at the bottom of the list. Interestingly, gaining access to raw materials does not play an important role for foreign investors. Turkey is not rich in petrol, iron or electricity or such kinds of resources, therefore foreign investors do not prefer to choose Turkey just in order to gain access to raw materials. Table 5 supports the idea that foreign investors welcome long-term strategy of the governments and the way that policies were applied. Long-term strategy including adjustment and stabilization policies has a mean score of 3.85.
Turkey experienced foreign exchange shocks during the 1990s and the volatility of exchange started to decrease after 2001. Therefore in Table 5 we see that foreign investors are pleased with foreign exchange The results of the questionnaire survey in this section indicate that executives of the MNCs operating in Turkey fi nd that investment incentives, investment promotion, FDI track record and investment facilitation are not prior motives for their company to invest in Turkey. In the survey, investment incentives with a score 2.98, investment facilitation with a mean score of 2.86 and FDI track record with a mean of 2.7 are at the bottom of the list. Investment promotion has a mean score of 2.88 which indicates that Turkey would need to engage in a concerted and focused marketing effort to advertise itself as an attractive investment location abroad. However, Turkey was unable to succeed in establishing a promotion agency until recently and the agency does not have a strong and clear mandate, setup and budget.
Developing a long-term FDI promotion strategy is crucial for several reasons; fi rst, prospective investors, even the largest fi rms, do not systematically search the world for opportunities. Information is imperfect and risk perceptions may not conform wholly to reality.
The search for opportunities is a bureaucratic process whose initiation and direction may be swayed by many factors, some of which are not purely objective.
Many emerging economies such as Malaysia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Ireland, and Singapore have active IPA. The IPAs of these countries build techniques to include advertising in general and specialized media; participate in investment exhibitions; facilitate investment missions from source countries; and conduct general information seminars on investment opportunities. Some IPAs go further and use the techniques including direct mail campaigns, industry or sector-specifi c investment missions or informational seminars, and one-on-one, face-to-face meetings with selected potential investors.
The role of institutional variables
In Turkey for foreign investors, political and macroeconomic instability are seen as the most signifi cant facts that hinder higher infl ows of FDI. Stability is a crucial factor when it comes to FDI because it is a way that investors measure the security of their investment and want to see prior to establishing their investment in a host country. It indicates the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized in unconstitutional way or by violent means. Where investors are uncertain about a country's political and economic stability they adopt a "wait and see" attitude. In the survey (Table 6) , political instability has a mean of 4.37 and macroeconomic instability has a mean of 4.35. In Turkey, some link political stability with a single-party government rather than with coalition parties ruling the country. However, indicators of political stability are government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and the rule of law. Most investors, when creating a business plan or project proposal, want to be able to estimate costs, competition, regulations, and potential returns.
Economic stability can be captured in macro-economic indicators, such as infl ation and growth. It can be argued that only if the country can provide a politically and economically more stable and open environment, can more specifi c efforts, targeted at improving the investment environment directly, be effective.
High mean scores of exchange rate risk and infl ation refl ect how respondents consider the 2001-2006 period when answering the survey. If the survey had been applied fi ve years earlier the mean scores would be much higher. However, the exchange risk and risk of infl ation with mean scores of 3.92 and 3.89 are welcome as deterrent indicators for investors. Insuffi cient development of fi nancial markets has a 3.22 mean score. Progress in establishing fi nancial infrastructure and capital markets is important for foreign investors because it facilitates access to local capital markets. The better developed markets encourage business to set up operations, as they can access complementary local fi nance more easily, and face lower transaction costs for local fi nancial services such as the payment system. However, foreign investors may substitute locally raised capital for capital raised on international capital markets, which would lead to a reduction of recorded FDI infl ow. Nonetheless, the received consensus is that the former effect dominates over the latter.
Although in many studies the positive effect of privatization on FDI is emphasized, interestingly, the slow progress of privatization programs does not have a priority as an obstacle of higher FDI infl ow with a mean score of 3.02.
Privatization is a signal to multinational investors that a country is ready to foster a competitive market economy. FDI can also be very useful to a nation's privatization process by bringing in additional management expertise and marketing channels. Given that, Turkey needs signifi cant FDI to enhance its infrastructure and to achieve its privatization goals, it needs a good environment for privatization and private participation in infrastructure. It also needs to privatize to attract even more FDI 13 .
Also, possible obstacles against EU membership do not have a priority as an obstacle to higher FDI infl ow with a mean score.
Interestingly, respondents do not identify Central and East European countries as primary competitors of Turkey. However, during the FIAS fi eld mission in 2000, more than 50 foreign and domestic fi rms interviewed identifi ed Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic as primary competitors of Turkey for FDI attraction. This fi nding is also supported in the study of H. Loewendahl and E. Loewendahl (2001) . Beyond the establishment of markets as basic institution for the exchange of goods and services, regulatory institutions such as a competition policy are required.
While liberalization has been rapid throughout the developing countries including Turkey, the process of designing and implementing competition policy has been far more complex 14 .
Governments in the less reformed countries continue to protect the markets of their local fi rms, even at the sub-national level. Studies, especially those focusing on transition economies reveal that only successful im- plementation has a strong positive relationship with the economy-wide intensity of competition, whereas the mere existence of rules does not.
The rule of law refers to the enforceability of contracts, something on which foreign investors place great importance. Investors want to know that their rights and their business will be protected when operating abroad. Corruption diminishes the rule of law, most simply because some businesses do not operate within the law and this reduces fair competition.
Unstable and unreliable, a non-transparent legal and regulatory framework with a mean of 3.84 is regarded as one of the most important deterrent factors by respondents. This is because an effi cient legal infrastructure reduces institutional uncertainties for foreign investors, facilitates the establishment and enforcement of contracts and in various other ways reduces the transaction costs of doing business in an economy. Turkey has fallen behind many other developing countries in effective liberalization of its legal framework, and in its enforcement practices to reap the benefi ts of the rapid globalization that is transforming international economic relationships. Poor implementation of existing legislation is one the main problems in Turkey. Missing implementing rules and administrative guidelines, inconsistent application of laws, incompetent bureaucrats in charge, and lack of judicial enforcement are the issues mentioned most frequently by foreign investors in interviews.
From the perspective of foreign investors, legislative reform in Turkey does not appear to be suffi ciently reliable. Adopted laws are often not implemented on time.
One of the executives replied to the question about the newly enacted laws: "Are you satisfi ed with the progress in the judicial system? By giving an answer, governments may carry on enacting laws; however, we are suspicious about the way they are interpreted". Another point frequently raised by investors is a lack of confi dence in the impartiality and quality of the commercial courts. Plus, most of the executives mentioned that unstable, non-transparent legal and regulatory framework make the Turkish business environment diffi cult to operate. Some argued that recently enacted laws about the recognition of patent rights are not applied with sensitivity.
Corruption is another issue raised by investors. While the recent government efforts to curb corruption deserve much praise, investors suggested that they do not trust in the impartiality of administrators in critical cases, especially in customs administration and municipal level procedures such as site development. Cor-ruption is marked in the Transparency International's year 2000; according to corruption perception index Turkey ranks 50 th among 90 nations listed (Transparency International 2006) .
Most of the executives I interviewed mentioned that corruption is a deterrent factor for foreign fi rms. I asked whether corruption may make things easier in the fi rst steps (the short term) of the investment process. All the answers emphasized that large corporations pay special attention to the institutional organization of the corporations. An institutionalized corporation pays special attention to certainty when operating in another country. Corruption makes things uncertain in a business environment which in the end may have negative effect on all fi rms operating in the long run.
The weakness of the judicial system and enforcement of contracts and the recognition of property rights create a feeling of insecurity and arbitrariness. Under such circumstances, the long-term commitment of substantial investment funds seems risky if plans are challenged or overturned from day to day, or whenever an offi cial is replaced. The weakness of the judicial system causes the increasing and unrestrained power of such offi cials. Plus, in countries in which the enforcement mechanisms are weak, the share of informal economy is large, in parallel. In other words, compliance with the formal institutions is too costly and the government does not have the power to effectively enforce its costly rules in these countries.
It is important to improve the enforcement of dispute resolution and "confl ict of interest" legislation.
However, in Turkey the executives that I interviewed emphasized that some of the laws in Turkey are ambiguous and therefore diffi cult to enforce. The rule of law is perceived as weak by foreign investors. This problem can be improved by creating an independent dispute resolution mechanism or by improving the legitimacy of those responsible for regulating legal disputes and contracts.
Not only are the administrative procedures time-consuming; enforcement procedures for commercial cases at the courts take much longer than in many other countries.
The protection of intellectual property rights is particularly important for producers with a high rate of innovation like computer software developers or pharmaceuticals, as well as producers of products with well-known trademarks like some beverages, clothes, or automobiles. As globalization has taken hold, good IPR protection is becoming more and more important to attract world-class technology and the export-oriented plants that have to use it.
As in other dimensions of the business environment in Turkey, the major problems in IPR protection are caused not so much by inadequate laws as by a lack of effective enforcement. Internationally known brand names and trademarks are increasingly subject to illegal exploitation and pirating. Since 1992, the US Treasury has listed Turkey on its Priority Watch List, under its Special 301 provision for continuous violation of intellectual property rights (FIAS 2001a, b) .
Whole legal framework for intellectual property rights is relatively new in Turkey, and much effort has been spent on fulfilling obligations stemming from the membership of the WTO and the accession to the EU. In the survey, administrative barriers such as complex, slow and expensive property registration process and too many days to resolve a commercial dispute in the country's courts have 3.59 and 3.50 mean scores. The mean scores are signifi cant although these indicators stay behind the several institutional variables in the list.
The Quality and Integrity of Public Services
The overall quality and effi ciency of services gives an idea about the legislation, infrastructure, and the sensitivity towards protecting property rights. As they fi nd these services attractive, they inform of the quality of the services to the foreign investors outside the country.
The overall quality and effi ciency of services delivered by the following public agencies or services (1 very bad to 5 very good) are presented in Table 8 . When the quality and integrity of public services are considered, it can be argued that indicators such as property rights, labour regulations and business licensing have moderate mean scores except for the quality of tax regulations and administration. Property rights has a mean score of 3.14; labor regulations -3.04, and business licensing -3.02. Executives, dur-ing the interviews, mentioned that tax regulations were complex, ineffi cient and hence, a deterring factor for FDI infl ows. Table 9 demonstrates that whereas indicators belonging to infrastructure have high mean scores, administrative and legislative issues have relatively low scores. Communication service is at the top of the list with a mean score of 3.87. Electric power has a mean score of 3.51, while transportation service has a score of 3.40 and the quality of roads has a mean score of 3.22. On the other hand, the quality of the functioning of government comes after the indicators of infrastructure with a mean score of 3.16. The score of 2.86 for the parliament and 2.65 for the judicial system reveal that foreign investors are suspicious about the quality of legislative and administrative functioning. As seen from the survey, the functioning of the judicial system and the predictability of rules and regulations are perceived as signifi cant by respondents. In order to get specifi c results, I asked questions regarding the year 2001 and the year 2006, in order to see whether any progress had taken place in fi ve years on these specifi c issues. In order to get specifi c results, I offered specifi c statements and asked if the respondents agreed with the statements or not.
The responses to the statement reveal that there was progress in obtaining information on the laws and regulations affecting respondents' fi rms ( Especially during the interviews, one of the important tasks that executives faced was the interpretations of regulations. Most of the executives stated that, although signifi cant changes took place in many areas such as the legislative and judicial system, and different interpretations of laws affect their operations negatively (Table 11 ). However, the table demonstrates that over the years, the number of respondents considering the interpretations of regulations as predictable and consistent increase signifi cantly. Regarding 2001, eight respondents believed in the consistency and predictability of regulations whereas, by 2006, the number increased to 22.
While the share of respondents decreased, the number of indifferent respondents, only slightly changed.
These results suggest that for the respondents, access to the information ofn laws and regulations, and the predictability and consistency of the regulations regarding their business improved during fi ve years.
However, according to respondents, while the predictability and consistency of regulations related to their business increased, in general, they are skeptical about the certainty and predictability of the general policy changes in the country (Table 12 ). The lowest mean scores in the survey are related to the predictability of changes in rules, laws and regulations (2.37 mean score) and changes in economic and fi nancial policies (2.22). Law-making procedures often lack participation of the people subject to it. Business organizations in Turkey complain that they are often not consulted when important legislation for the business environment is being drafted; this again indicates that most offi cials do not see investors as a constituency which they should heed. The business community feels left out in the democratic process of discussing changes in the legislation.
Conclusions
The fi ndings presented in this paper, when incorporated with the existing works on FDI, provide an explanation of the distribution of foreign direct investment across countries. The empirical results point to the importance of political and economic institutions for foreign direct investment.
In this paper, my results point out that the effect of macroeconomic indicators such as market size, growth rate, GDP per capita on FDI is positive. In addition, what this study suggests is that institutional variables such as low level of corruption, government stability, enforcement of contract law, functioning of judicial system, transparent, legal and regulatory framework, political and economic stability, intellectual property rights, effi ciency of justice and prudential standards have also signifi cant impact on FDI in Turkey.
These results make a real contribution to the empirical literature by validating the role of a large set of institutional variables on foreign direct investment fl ows and they are encouraging in the sense that efforts towards raising the quality of institutions may help Turkey to receive more FDI, hence help the country to enjoy higher values of GDP per capita. The results of the study reveal that the nature of the interaction between MNCs and each country is the result of a more complex set of factors than only market size or market-related variables orientation. It takes place within the host country's unique economic, social, and legal structures; it involves institutions.
As a rule, legal infrastructures, including legal system development and enforcement, are generally weak in most developing countries. Bribery and corruption are obviously more invasive in emerging markets than in advanced economies. The roles of law and judicial systems differ among countries. The gap between the law on the books and the law in practice can be vast. Legal standards tend to be ideals, not necessarily achievable.
A stable, reliable, business climate will lower costs, thereby encouraging FDI. Avoiding problems with regulatory, bureaucratic and judicial hurdles, property rights, enforceable contracts, performance and content requirements, or bribe payments will be seen as positive because they reduce risk and uncertainty.
Recently, Turkey has made considerable progress in modernizing its business legislation. In the fi rst half of the 1980s there were major reforms, and a second wave that began in the mid-1990s is still underway. While there are some gaps in the body of laws and regulations, poor implementation of existing legislation is the main problem. Missing implementing rules and administrative guidelines, inconsistent application of laws, incompetent bureaucrats in charge, and lack of judicial enforcement are the main problems.
In order to increase the quality of institutions in order to enjoy high economic growth rates and receive high levels of FDI infl ows the state should adopt several policies such as introduction of independent regulatory agencies in various fi elds such as competition, banking, and telecommunications; adoption of modern legislation to protect industrial property rights; invitation of all relevant business association to comment on draft legislation.
In conclusion, the ability of countries to benefi t from investment activities is infl uenced by active policies. By providing the appropriate legal and institutional environment, host country governments can create conditions that will not only attract foreign investors, but also encourage local fi rms to expand their investment or to establish new operations.
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